Playing Both Sides: Syria’s Two Faced Game for Recovery
Pragmatism in the new era - How Syria plays both sides
Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, made headlines on October 15 when he shook hands with his predecessor's most steadfast backer, Vladimir Putin. Indeed, although the new regime actively seeks to appeal to the West, it is still presently pulling economic benefits from Russia. Indeed, Sharaa just affirmed that all economic agreements signed under Assad with Russia would be maintained. That agreement took place even though Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ousted the Russian-backed regime in January 2025, with Bashar al-Assad currently living under the Kremlin’s protection in Moscow. As such, the current watchword for Russo-Syrian relations seems to be pragmatism. However, it remains uncertain whether Ahmed al-Sharaa will be able to keep positioning himself between Russia and the West in the long run.
Perhaps the most central talking point when it comes to Syria’s recovery are the heavy sanctions still looming over the country, most of which were adopted after Assad’s regime violently cracked down on civilians during the 2011 protests. These notably included the freezing of trade, assets, and economic resources for major Syrian industrial producers. Entities such as the Central Bank of Syria were also sanctioned.
Thankfully, the EU agreed to lift the bulk of these sanctions in order to facilitate Syria's recovery after the HTS coup. However, these lifts are not without their caveats: security concerns remain on the domestic level, as new targeted sanctions were imposed after an outburst of violence in the Latakya region in March 2025. As the EU remains on edge about domestic forces and the state’s ability to maintain security, any slip up from the newly formed government, whose security forces are formed from a coalition of multiple ex-jihadi groups, would mean a return to economic isolation.
It remains to be seen how the sustainment of Russian economic and military influence might affect domestic security, considering Russia’s past involvement. The Kremlin did directly arm and support state violence against the Syrian people under Assad’s regime. It was also complicit in sponsoring extremist groups after 2011 in order to delegitimize the protests. In light of this, Sharaa’s government has expressed worry that Russia might seek to refuel anti-government groups.
On the American front, President Trump declared in June 2025 his intention to “give Syrians a chance at greatness.” To put this statement into motion, he signed an executive order lifting all sanctions on Syria. However, executive orders cannot revoke sanctions enshrined into law, which the Caesar Act is as of 2019. This act consequently remains in force, and effectively criminalizes both US and foreign entities who entertain any kind of economic relation with the Syrian state and subsequent offshoots. As such, the billions in investment pledged by the Gulf countries to the new Syrian state are still on hold, as these countries still risk secondary sanctions levied under the Caesar Act. To be repealed, the Act will need to follow a lengthy legislative process. The length of this process remains uncertain, particularly given the current American political climate, since the Senate, the House of Representatives, and president, will all need to agree on a version of the revised Act.
In light of the prolonged risk of sanctions, the courting of Western governments is not close to being over for Ahmed al-Sharaa. Given any domestic security issue, or a change of perception in the US government, initiatives to lift sanctions might fall apart. This would impede the country’s ability to receive investment and reopen its economy. Consequently, Sharaa has been presenting himself on the global scene as a cooperative figure for the West, willing to liberalize Syria’s economy. Concurrent to reassuring the EU and the US of his pro-Western stance and economically liberal approach, Sharaa has visited Moscow, affirming that the country will maintain all economic accords previously signed between Russia and Bashar al-Assad, as well as two military bases. This in turn, puts Syria in a delicate spot as in recent years, it has been EU and US policy to sanction any country supporting Russia’s “war economy.” In light of this, it remains to be seen how long Syria can maintain its two-faced game: appealing to the West, while opening its country to Russian oil and military interests. Evidently, Sharaa’s deal with Russia doesn’t come from a place of political alignment but rather pragmatism. This begs the question of how vital Russia actually is to Syria’s current economy.
Paradoxically, the sanctions imposed by Western governments throughout the Assad years - notably from the Caesar Act - made the country highly reliant on Russia. From an economic perspective, oil is central to Syria’s energy needs and development. Although Syrian soil is rich in oil, it exists in a brute form, which Syria does not have the infrastructure to refine and use. Thus, oil imports are vital to keep the industrial economy running. Under economic strain and uncertainty, the Syrian government desperately needs two things: oil that is cheap and reliable. Russia - riddled with sanctions, possessing large oil reserves, and having established trade and logistical routes in the region - seems to be the only supplier of this commodity. Additionally, the threat of sanctions have also turned Syria into a market global oil traders still view as too financially risky to invest in. Thus, despite a desire to appeal to the West, and despite Russia’s protection of ex-president Bashar al-Assad, Sharaa has made the pragmatic concession of preserving Russian presence within the country. The Kremlin has in turn used this economic leverage to secure the presence of two military bases in Syria. Most notably, its Tartous naval base, which serves as Russia’s only direct Mediterranean access point and as a sendoff point for cargo headed to Africa. This highlights the entanglement of interests between Russia and Syria, and the pragmatic approach they’ve taken to address them. It is highly unlikely that Russia will allow Syria to detach itself from its influence. And given that Sharaa’s primary concern in his nation building process is to avoid security problems, it is also unlikely that he will challenge the Russian status quo in foreseeable years.
Will Syria’s collaboration in maintaining crucial Russian military and economic interests be tolerated by Western governments, or will this two-faced game spoil Syria’s effort to stay in their good graces? In recent years, international relations have been redefined in a way that may allow for such pragmatic ambiguity. Although the EU would like to contain Russian influence, it seeks to keep the region stable and avoid another refugee crisis spillover. On the Russian front, although HTS has toppled the country’s closest ally in the region, Russia cannot afford to lose its market for oil and crucial Mediterranean access point. For the US, although Syria is currently enabling Russia to sustain its regional influence, this turning point in Syrian history is a unique opportunity to redefine the state’s political identity, even as its future remains in the grey zone. Additionally, President Trump seems to be less concerned by international allegiances, and more so by redefining regional order in the Middle-East, notably through what has been qualified as “transactional” relations. Perhaps we are witnessing one of the first concrete examples of nation building processes in a world that is less so defined by hegemonic orders and battles of influence, and more so by pragmatic assessments and hard power leveraging.
References
¹ https://www.newarab.com/news/syrias-sharaa-seeks-reset-russia-relations-putin-meeting
⁵ https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/10/syria-targets-francophone-jihadis-sharaa-navigates-western-pressure
⁶ https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-syrias-sharaa-discuss-fate-russian-military-bases-wednesday-kremlin-says-2025-10-15/
⁷ https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/termination-of-syria-sanctions#:~:text=The%20President%20ordered%20the%20cessation,the%20Revocation%20of%20Syria%20Sanctions.
⁸ https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31
⁹ https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/10/syria-targets-francophone-jihadis-sharaa-navigates-western-pressure
¹⁰ https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/10/syrias-business-elite-embrace-sharaa-push-caesar-sanctions-repeal
¹¹ https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-russian-oil-flows-reveal-about-syria-and-lebanons-energy-sectors